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INTRODUCTION 
While academics, policy advocates, and politicians continue to 
debate what market mechanism best addresses human-caused 
 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1984; B.A., 
Middlebury College, 1980. 
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climate change, there is a growing likelihood that the United 
States’ response will take the form of a cap-and-trade program 
seeking to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions reductions.  
Cap-and-trade programs, like the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009,1 
incorporate tradable emissions rights—essentially tradable rights to 
pollute.  Because they create economic rights in the global 
commons, some environmentalists have principled objections to 
cap-and-trade.2  These objections derive doctrinal support from the 
public trust doctrine—an ancient notion rooted in both the 
common law and in Roman law.  Under the traditional conception 
of the public trust doctrine, certain public resources, such as 
flowing water, shorelands, and the air, are not susceptible of private 
ownership but are instead held by the sovereign “in trust” for the 
benefit of the public.3 
The global atmospheric climate system certainly falls within the 
scope of the broadest conception of public trust assets that 
government may not alienate—the atmospheric climate system is, 
after all, a component of the “air.”  Less certain, however, is the 
source and applicability of public trust limits in U.S. law, especially 
as to how those limits might apply to legislation at the federal level.  
Assuming the public trust doctrine applies to federal legislation 
allocating pollution rights in the atmosphere, there remains the 
question whether the public trust doctrine presents an absolute 
barrier to the grant of pollution rights, or whether it only limits the 
scope of such grants without precluding them outright. 
This Article concludes that public trust doctrine limits are 
applicable to federal legislation since these limits are inherent in 
the nature of sovereignty.  The contemporary version of the public 
trust doctrine that prevails under U.S. law, however, is not an 
absolute prohibition on the alienation of public lands.4  A cap-and-
trade system for controlling GHG emissions is not irreconcilable 
with the public trust doctrine; however, a cap-and-trade program 
whose cap exceeds scientifically proven sustainable limits on GHGs 
violates sustainability principles implicit in U.S. public trust 
 
1. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
2. See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
3. Branford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations:  Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open 
Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 83 (2009) (discussing the history 
of the public trust doctrine). 
4. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine.5  Public trust precepts also provide an interpretational 
principle that limits the possibility that tradable emissions rights 
might become a form of property entitlement. 
Part I of this Article introduces the concept of cap-and-trade and 
identifies the benefits and drawbacks of emissions trading, with a 
particular focus on the ethical objections to granting a right to 
pollute.  Part II presents the public trust doctrine and explores the 
doctrinal source of public trust limits on governmental action, the 
applicability of public trust principles to federal legislation, and the 
extension of the federal public trust doctrine beyond the 
traditional public trust zone of territorial navigable waters.  Part III 
assesses the implications that the public trust doctrine, as defined 
in Part II, could have on a GHG cap-and-trade program. 
I.  CAP-AND-TRADE EMISSIONS REGULATION AND GREENHOUSE GASES 
Although a cap-and-trade system remains controversial, it appears 
to be the form of GHG regulation most likely to be adopted in the 
United States.  A cap-and-trade system (also known as tradable 
emissions rights, or emissions trading) underlies the GHG bill 
approved by the House of Representatives in the spring of 2009, 
the most recent Senate climate bill, which was proposed by 
Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer,6 as well as the nascent 
international GHG control system adopted in the Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
Before addressing the public trust implications of a cap-and-trade 
system of GHG emissions control, a basic understanding of cap-
and-trade pollution control schemes, as well as the basic arguments 
for and against those schemes, is helpful. 
A.  What is Cap-and-Trade?  
A cap-and-trade emissions control scheme is one of the three 
approaches under consideration for domestic control of GHG 
emissions.  The other two possibilities are direct regulation of 
sources (“command-and-control” regulation) or carbon taxes.  
Under traditional “command-and-control” regulatory schemes 
currently in effect in the United States for water pollution and 
major sources of air pollution, government agencies acting under 
 
5. See infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
6. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010). 
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statutory authority regulate each source of GHGs through a permit 
system or by industry-wide regulatory requirements.7  Carbon taxes, 
on the other hand, seek to reduce GHG emissions by taxing GHG 
generating activity and relying on the resulting economic incentive 
to reduce these activities.8 
A cap-and-trade regulatory scheme combines both government 
regulation and economic incentive.  Under a cap-and-trade 
regulatory scheme, government regulators cap the total permissible 
quantity of a pollutant (or related family of pollutants) to be 
released in the entire geographic area, divide the cap into smaller 
units (pollution allocations), and distribute the allocations, which 
can then be bought and sold.9  Unlike command-and-control 
regulatory schemes, this overall cap is not incorporated into 
individual permits for individual pollutant sources.10  Instead, 
 
7. Examples of “command-and-control” regulations currently in effect include the point 
source permitting schemes established by both the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 
1342 (2006), and Title V of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a), 7661(c) (2006).  Both of 
these schemes contemplate individual permits for pollution sources, including specific 
pollution limitations established by either federal or state regulatory agencies.  The ban on 
lead additives in automobile fuels, 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(b) (2010), adopted pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006), is an example of an industry-wide regulatory 
prohibition.  In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in a case involving EPA authority to regulate 
new automobile emissions pursuant to Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006), that 
GHGs constituted “pollutants” within EPA’s regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act.  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).  EPA has since made an “endangerment” 
finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I), setting the 
stage for similar regulatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions.  See generally Robert R. 
Nordhaus, The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 53 (2007) (noting that issuing an endangerment finding would allow EPA to impose 
carbon dioxide standards for motor vehicles); Daniel Brian, Note, Regulating Carbon Dioxide 
Under the Clean Air Act as a Hazardous Pollutant, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369 (2008); Jonathan 
S. Martel, Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Climate Change Law and Litigation in the Aftermath of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 7 DAILY ENV’T REP., Nov. 6, 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/BNA-Artice_Martel_1107.pdf. 
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax:  Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 67, 67 (2008). 
9. See, e.g., EPA, Clean Air Markets:  Allowance Trading, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
trading/basics.html (last visited May 13, 2010). 
10. Under traditional “command-and-control” regulatory systems such as the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act, environmental regulators are tasked with allocating 
environmental quality based emissions caps among individual pollution discharges through a 
permitting system.  For example, under the Clean Water Act Section 303, a state with waters 
that do not meet water quality standards must establish a “total maximum daily load” for 
pollutants in that water body.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006).  The State (or the EPA) 
must then perform a “wasteload allocation” in order to allocate the permissible maximum 
daily load among the pollutant sources.  40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(h), 130.7(a) (2010).  Effluent 
limitations based on these waste load allocations must then be incorporated into individual 
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tradable pollution allocations are distributed among sources, either 
free of charge or by government sale or auction.11  Managers of 
pollution sources are then free to buy and sell allocations.12 
In theory, the overall social cost of achieving a certain level of 
emissions reductions using tradable allocations is lower than using 
command-and-control.13  Cap-and-trade relies on the marketability 
of the pollution allocations to encourage emitters with the lowest 
cost of pollution control to achieve the greatest reductions.14  The 
low-cost polluter will achieve a greater reduction than its 
proportional share, so that it may generate credits (or use fewer 
allocations) that can be sold to the high-cost polluter at a profit.15  
The high-cost polluter will continue emitting at high levels by 
paying the low-cost polluter to achieve greater reductions.16  Under 
the command-and-control alternative, both the high-cost actor and 
the low-cost actor are required to make the same emissions 
reductions, resulting in greater overall social cost.17  While carbon 
taxes provide similar social flexibility to cap-and-trade, a cap-and-
trade system allows the government to establish a cap, while the 
market price for the polluting activity is set by supply and 
demand.18  On the other hand, under a carbon tax system, the 
 
permits.  40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d), 122.44(d) (2010).  See generally OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, EPA-
505-2-90-001, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED TOXICS CONTROL 
67 (1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/exposure/pubs/efast2refs.htm (follow link 
at reference 15 under “reference from main text” section).  State or federal regulators must 
undertake a similar pollution loading allocation process in order to develop State or Federal 
Implementation Plans under section 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).  This 
section requires regulators to come up with enforceable emissions limitations applicable to 
individual sources in order to meet national ambient air quality standards.  42 U.S.C. § 
7410(a)(2)(A) (2006).  Like the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load program 
(“TMDL”) program, a cap-and-trade program would establish an overall cap on emissions, 
but unlike the TMDL program, a cap-and-trade program would not require regulators to 
allocate the cap among individual emissions sources. 
11. EPA, supra note 9. 
12. Id.  See also ROB JOHANSSON, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW REGULATORY STANDARDS 
CAN AFFECT A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES (2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publications (follow link to environment page, then scroll down). 
13. Zimmer, supra note 8, at 67; see also JOHANSSON, supra note 12. 
14. JOHANSSON, supra note 12. 
15. Id.; see also Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Economics of Climate Change, 
http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/ClimateEconomics.html (last visited May 
22, 2010). 
16. See EPA, Cap and Trade, Frequent Questions, 
http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
17. See Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 599 (1995). 
18. See EPA, supra note 16. 
  
292 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:2 
 
carbon price is set by government, either through agency action or 
by legislation, and the market then determines the amount of 
polluting activity that will occur.19  Both carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade systems force polluters to internalize the economic costs of 
environmental degradation associated with carbon emissions.20  
This cost-internalization potential is hailed by members of both the 
economic21 and environmental communities.22 
In order to function, a cap-and-trade program must have an 
overall cap, include all significant sources of the regulated 
pollutant, involve pollutants that are fungible both in their effects 
and in the location of their source, have an open market 
mechanism for buying and selling allocations, and contemplate 
strict monitoring and enforcement.23  An overall cap is the most 
basic element of cap-and-trade—without a cap, no emissions 
reductions can be achieved and tradable allowances would have no 
value.  For the cap to be environmentally effective, all significant 
sources of the relevant pollutant must be included within the 
program.  The pollutants involved must be ecologically and 
geographically fungible—for a reduction by one emitter effectively 
to offset emissions by a second emitter, the second emitter’s 
pollution must not have localized impacts outside the geographic 
range of the offsetting reductions benefits, and the pollutant that is 
reduced must be ecologically equivalent to the pollutant that 
continues to be emitted.24  An open market system is necessary to 
assure reducers of pollution that they will be able to market and 
receive compensation for their excess reductions, and to establish 
an appropriate price.  Finally, strict monitoring and enforcement is 
necessary to ensure that the cap is not violated and that the 
allocations are not robbed of their value through cheating. 
The most successful cap-and-trade program to date is the Acid 
Rain Program of Clean Air Act Title IV, which established and 
 
19. Id. 
20. See Zimmer, supra note 8, at 67. 
21. See infra Part I.B. 
22. Id. 
23. See generally A. DENNY ELLERMAN & DAVID HARRISON, JR., EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  EXPERIENCE, LESSONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 4–9 
(2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions_trading.pdf; James 
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
607, 616–17 (2000). 
24. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 23, at 611–12; Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2:  Lessons 
of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 106–07 (2008). 
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achieved a cap on power plant acid rain emissions at fifty percent 
of 1990 levels at a cost far below (probably inflated) industry 
estimates by 2000.25  Under the Clean Air Act Title IV program, 
EPA established a system of tradable SOx/NOx emissions 
allowances.  Starting in the year 2000, a total cap of 8.95 million 
allowances, or approximately fifty percent of the 1990 total 
emissions level,26 was set, with each allowance authorizing the 
holder to emit one ton of SOx/NOx.  Most allowances were 
distributed to the existing electrical utilities based on historical 
emissions, though a small percentage was held for market 
stabilization and auction purposes.  SOx/NOx allowances are traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade.27  All large electric generators are 
required to hold sufficient allowances to cover their annual 
emissions for each year,28 and new generators must purchase 
allowances in order to begin operation.29  A utility with emissions 
exceeding the utility’s allowance holdings is subject to a fine of 
$2,000 per ton and must make up the excess emissions by acquiring 
allowances the following year.30 
The Acid Rain Program’s relative success can be attributed to its 
compatibility with most of the essential elements of an effective 
cap-and-trade program as described above.  Acid rain precursors 
are fungible both across pollutants (sulfur oxides versus nitrogen 
oxides) as well as (for the most part)31 geographically.  The trading 
program set a relatively firm cap on overall emissions, though 
whether that cap was ecologically adequate remains to be seen.  
Allowance requirements are monitored and enforced and there 
 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2009).  See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS’N ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE 
1990 CLEAN AIR ACT:  EPA SPEAKS 51–57 (1991); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on 
Long Island Sound:  Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 156–63 
(1998). 
26. See EPA, Clean Air Markets, Acid Rain Program, Basic Information, http://www.epa. 
gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last visited May 22, 2010). 
27. Chicago Board of Trade, Environmental Products, http://www.cmegroup.com (last 
visited May 22, 2010). 
28. See EPA, supra note 26. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides can also have localized health impacts, so a 
reduction in one geographic area is not perfectly environmentally fungible with a reduction 
in another geographic area.  See generally Lily N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market be Fair and 
Efficient?  An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999).  
The acid rain impacts of sulfur and nitrogen oxides, however, are geographically dispersed. 
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exists an open, public market for the trading of allowances.32  The 
Acid Rain Program met its goals in emissions reductions, although 
several commentators have noted that this reduction was achieved 
by the relatively low-cost means of switching to available low-sulfur 
fuels rather than reducing energy production, installing expensive 
scrubbers, or developing innovative pollution-reduction 
technologies.33 
As many commentators have observed, global GHG emissions, 
like acid rain precursors, appear to be an excellent candidate for a 
cap-and-trade program.34  GHGs are fungible:  a reduction in one 
GHG, such as methane, is just as beneficial for reducing global 
warming as reducing the global warming equivalent of another 
GHG, such as carbon dioxide, once the quantities are adjusted for 
their relative potencies for promoting global warming.35  GHGs are 
geographically fungible as well, because GHGs are well-mixed in 
the atmosphere so that there are no local “hotspots.”36 
GHGs thus satisfy the geographic and ecological fungibility tests 
for a cap-and-trade program, and the Title IV acid rain trading 
program demonstrates the feasibility of having an open, free 
market in emissions allocations (as does the existing GHG trading 
program set up in the European Union under the Kyoto 
Protocol).37  Less certain is the ability to capture all significant 
 
32. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:  Moving Toward 
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 399–403 (2009). 
33. See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater:  Why the 
Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
799, 810 (2008); Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions 
Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 59 (1998); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn From the 
Grand Policy Experiment?  Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 79 (1998). 
34. See Jason Mathers & Michelle Manion, Cap-and-Trade Systems, CATALYST, Spring 2005, 
at 18, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/catalyst/Catalyst-Spring-
2005.pdf; Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for Conservation:  The Evolving Use 
of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental Improvement in and Across Multiple Media, 14 
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 156 (2006). 
35. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature:  Which Federal Climate Change 
Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 148 (2007).  As Professor 
Carol Rose has noted, however, the fungibility issue becomes more complicated when 
carbon trading schemes attempt to assign GHG equivalencies to indirect emissions 
reductions such as offsets and clean development.  See Rose, supra note 24, at 106–07. 
36. Compare Rose, supra note 24 (explaining the properties of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere), with Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice:  Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 231 (1999) 
(bringing attention to a problem that exists with many pollutants being traded and creating 
“toxic hot-spots”). 
37. See INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N & THE WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE 
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sources of GHG emissions globally under an emissions trading 
program (as is required for an effective cap-and-trade program), 
because of the ubiquity of GHG sources throughout human 
activity.  And as strong as the economic virtues of a cap-and-trade 
program might be, such a program will fail to prevent climate 
change if the cap is not set at an ecologically sound level.  The jury 
is still out on the question of whether the Acid Rain Program has 
actually eliminated acid rain impacts on northeastern lakes and 
forests.  Some places have seen improvements while others have 
not, and recovery from decades of acid rain will take time.38  This 
indicates that the acid deposition cap may have been set too high.39 
To be effective ecologically, the “cap” in a cap-and-trade program 
must be based on an accurate assessment of the level of pollutant 
that the ecological system can sustain without damage.40  To achieve 
an environmental mitigation goal, the scientific, political, and 
regulatory systems must together arrive at the “correct” cap that 
exploits the assimilative capacity of the ecological system while 
avoiding environmental harm.41  For a cap to be effective, however, 
it must be scientifically based on the assimilative capacity of the 
global ecosystem.  Unfortunately, any GHG cap is more likely to be 
established through political negotiation than by scientific 
consensus, and the political pressures, both domestic and 
international, will work towards setting a cap that exceeds the 
ecologically efficient level.42 
 
CARBON MARKET 2006 3–5 (2006), available at http://www.ieta.org/ieta/ 
www/pages/getfile.php?doc ID=1667; EPA, Clean Air Markets 2008 Emissions, Compliance, 
and Clean Air Markets Analysis, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP_2.html (last 
visited May 16, 2010) (discussing EPA’s Acid Rain Program). 
38. James Dao, Acid Rain Law Found to Fail in Adirondacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at 
A1; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED NO. 00-47, ACID RAIN:  EMISSIONS TRENDS AND 
EFFECTS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (Mar. 2000), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00047.pdf. 
39. McAllister, supra note 32, at 412–13, 421–23. 
40. See William F. Pedersen, The Limits of Market Based Approaches to Environmental 
Protection, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10173, n.17 (1994) (criticizing trading programs that fail to 
establish an environmental quality based cap). 
41. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for Conservation:  The Evolving Use 
of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental Improvement In and Across Multiple Media, 14 
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 159 (2006) (arguing that the water quality cap requires 
consideration of pollution carrying capacity of the stream). 
42. See generally B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 445 (2007). 
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B.  Pros and Cons of Emissions Trading  
Despite the economic efficiencies that emissions trading offers as 
the least-social-cost means of achieving a given environmental goal, 
emissions trading has its detractors.43  Arguments for a cap-and-
trade approach to GHG emissions include its economic 
efficiencies, its inherent promotion of full compliance, and its 
relative political palatability.  Opponents of cap-and-trade argue 
that equivalent efficiencies can be achieved through carbon taxes, 
are skeptical about technological innovation claims made by cap-
and-trade proponents, and question the morality of selling rights to 
commit an immoral act of pollution.  This author concludes that, 
on balance, the economic efficiencies and relative political 
palatability of an appropriate cap-and-trade regime make it the best 
choice for controlling GHGs, at least within the United States. 
Emissions trading is lauded as a means to achieve environmental 
goals at the least overall cost to industry and, by extension, to 
society more generally.44  In addition to the efficiency gains 
achieved by diverting pollution control to the lowest-cost 
reductions, some commentators argue that tradable emissions 
rights encourage technological innovation by rewarding 
entrepreneurs who develop new and cheaper pollution control 
technologies or pollution avoiding processes with a ready market,45 
though others argue that a cap-and-trade system actually stifles 
technological innovation by enshrining existing low-cost 
technologies and failing to up the ante sufficiently to encourage 
innovation.46  From the market perspective, Wall Street traders and 
hedge fund managers welcome a new commodities market in 
tradable emissions rights as a source of trading commissions and 
private deal-making.47  In addition to emissions trading, other 
 
43. See generally Reuven Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change:  
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 3 (2009). 
44. See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
45. See Flatt, supra note 35, at 136; ROBERT STAVINS, CAP-AND-TRADE VERSUS THE 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2009), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=355. 
46. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10094, 10103–05, 10107 (2003); see also David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?:  The 
Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 47 
(1998). 
47. See Leila Abboud, Economists Strike Gold in Climate-Change Fight, AP BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 
13, 2008. 
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economic incentives, such as a carbon tax, are proposed as 
alternative methods through which equivalent efficiencies can be 
obtained with lower transaction costs.48 
Environmentalists are split on the merits of emissions trading on 
both practical and principled grounds.  Some are enthusiastic 
about cap-and-trade.  The GHG cap-and-trade controls put forward 
in the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act have 
been endorsed by twenty-nine environmental organizations, 
including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental 
Defense Fund, Sierra Club, League of Conservation Voters, the 
Nature Conservancy, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the 
National Audubon Society.49  In addition to the arguments based 
on economic efficiency and technological innovation, these 
organizations support a cap-and-trade approach in part because of 
its perceived political achievability.50 
It is worth noting the powerful practical and political arguments 
in favor of a cap-and-trade system as a means of controlling global 
GHG emissions.  In addition to the arguments for entrepreneurial 
technology development and the economic efficiency advantages 
of emissions trading, other benefits include certainty of 
enforcement and political feasibility.  Since the value of the 
economic rights created by emissions trading depends on adequate 
monitoring and enforcement, market forces actually impel full 
enforcement of the regulatory regime.  Thus, enforcement of limits 
imposed by a cap-and-trade system tends to be closer to the full 
enforcement necessary to achieve environmental quality goals.51  
Put simply, no one will pay twenty-four euros per ton to emit 
carbon dioxide if bootleg emitters who do not purchase allocations 
are unlikely to be caught and punished.  Purchasers, speculators, 
and dealers in emissions credits all have vested interests—
potentially worth billions of dollars—in seeing full enforcement of 
 
48. See generally William A. Pizer, Climate Change Catastrophes (Resources for the Future, 
Discussion Paper No. 03-31, 2003), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-
03-31.pdf. 
49. See Posting of Dr. Joseph Romm to Climate Progress, 
http://climateprogress.org/2009/06/24/sierra-club-waxman-markey-league-of-conservation-
voters/ (June 24, 2009, 15:42 EST). 
50. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Cap and Trade: The Best Option, Sept. 22, 2009, 
http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=10380 (last visited May 28, 2010). 
51. See Lesley McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation:  Compliance in Cap and 
Trade Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 329–30 (2007). 
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emissions limits.52  Many environmental norms go under-enforced 
where the only constituency served by enforcement is the 
environmental community.53  The addition of vested economic 
interests to the usual array of environmental interests should help 
to eliminate discretionary non-enforcement as the underlying 
emissions norm. 
Some environmentalists, however, are less optimistic about cap-
and-trade.  Both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth opposed the 
Waxman-Markey bill, asserting that it would do little to reduce 
GHG emissions.54  On practical grounds, some commentators 
question the technology-advancing benefits of emissions trading 
programs.  David Dreisen argues that emissions trading programs 
encourage the “cheap fix” rather than more expensive technology 
improvements.55  Other commentators have pointed out that the 
Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program did not result in new scrubber 
technologies or even widespread installation of existing scrubber 
technology.56  Rather, it led to a shift in the market to favor low-
sulfur western coal that was already available.57 
 
52. See id. at 318; see also Blas Perez Henriquez, Information Technology:  The Unsung Hero of 
Market-Based Environmental Policies, RESOURCES, Fall/Winter 2004, at 9, 11, available at 
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Resources/Documents/152/RFF_Resources_152_infotech.
pdf; see also Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in EMISSIONS 
TRADING:  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY’S NEW APPROACH 3, 30–31 (Richard F. Kosobud ed., 
2000).  The value of the carbon trading market is expected to reach $1.4 trillion by the year 
2020.  Posting of Ben Geman to E2 Wire, The Hill’s Energy & Environment Blog, Carbon 
Emissions Market Could Reach $1.4 Trillion in 2020, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-
wire/76637-global-carbon-market-could-reach-14-trillion-in-2010-report (Jan. 19, 2010, 14:25 
EST). 
53. Cf. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 
121 (2005) (arguing that environmental under-enforcement arises from interest group 
pressures); Barton Thompson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy:  The Continuing 
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 191 (2000) (noting the structural 
factors leading to government underenforcement of environmental regulations). 
54. See News Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey (June 25, 
2009), http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/greenpeace-opposes- 
waxman-mark (last visited May 16, 2010); Friends of the Earth, We Can Do Better, We Must, 
http://www.foe.org/global-warming/we-can-do-better (last visited May 14, 2010).  These 
organizations do not necessarily oppose any cap-and-trade system in principle, and based 
their opposition to the Waxman-Markey bill on perceived weaknesses and loopholes in the 
cap-and-trade system it proposes.  See also FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, HOUSE GREEN ECONOMY 
BILL FALLS SHORT (2009), available at http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/ 
WM%20factsheet.pdf. 
55.  Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?:  The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change 
Convention, supra note 46, at 41–46. 
56. See sources cited supra note 33. 
57. Id. 
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Environmentalists also question the legitimacy of emissions 
trading programs on ethical grounds.58  Professor Kirk Junker has 
observed that emissions trading programs rest on the flawed moral 
premise that there exists a “right to pollute” that can be converted 
to tradable property rights.59  A right to pollute is inconsistent with 
a right to a clean environment—or, stated another way, a right to a 
clean environment implies a duty not to pollute, and is therefore in 
direct contradiction with a system based on tradable pollution 
rights.60  Tradable property interests have a way of becoming vested 
and inalienable over time no matter how clearly the initial property 
interest is limited.61  As discussed below, these ethical objections to 
tradable emissions rights also draw support from the public trust 
doctrine, which holds that certain natural resources, by their very 
 
58. See Robert Hahn & Gordon Lester, Where Did All the Markets Go?  An Analysis of EPA’s 
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 142 (1989); STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE 
INCENTIVES?  ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46 (1981) (“For some, it is an issue of 
morality:  clean air is a basic inalienable right that is not for sale at any price.”); James T.B. 
Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights 
Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 370 (1989) (“Some [environmentalists] oppose credit 
exchange mechanisms, which implicitly recognize rights to release pollutants into the 
environment, based on a belief that harming the natural environment is wrong under any 
circumstances, and that putting a price on environmental issues cheapens them by making 
them matters of private interest and not matters of public-spirited societal consensus.”); 
Norman W. Spaulding III, Note, Commodification and Its Discontents:  Environmentalism and the 
Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 322 (1997) (“The significance of the 
statement that no one ought to have a market-transferable right to pollute is simply that it 
attempts to draw a line between conduct properly relegated to the whims of the marketplace 
and conduct properly controlled by other means. The moral consequences of erasing this 
line [are] something environmentalists must consider.”). 
59. Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 168 
(2006). 
60. Id. at 161–70; see also Drury et al., supra note 36, at 269. 
61. Even the most absolute of modern rights in real property, the fee simple absolute, 
evolved from a restricted feudal license between lord and tenant.  The fee simple tenancy 
was originally not alienable, and subject to restricted rules of inheritance.  See generally 1–13 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 13.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009).  Not until the 12th 
century were such property rights freely inheritable, and not until the 13th century were they 
freely alienable.  See id.  A modern example of a license vesting into a property right is the so-
called “vested rights” doctrine under which a property owner’s building permit matures into 
a “vested right.”  See generally ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS Ch. 52D (Eric Kelly ed., 
2009).  Industry groups have argued in the past, in resisting added procedures for permit 
renewals, that “[t]he courts have long recognized that a company operating for a substantial 
period of time under a validly issued permit has a vested property right.”  See Cheryl Hogue, 
Comments on Title VI Guidance Seek Clearer Definitions, Input from More Parties, 29 ENV’T REP. 
CUR. DEV. (BNA) 234 (1998).  For a general discussion of how temporary government 
programs evolve into de facto property rights, see Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to 
Government Action:  How Modern Property Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 368 (1986). 
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nature, are not susceptible to private ownership.62   
As noted, cap-and-trade programs have wider industry acceptance 
than other emissions control measures and are thus more likely to 
be achievable in a political system where little legislation passes 
Congress without the approval of industry lobbyists.63  Industry 
prefers cap-and-trade to a tax or to regulatory limits because of the 
flexibility in market mechanisms to avoid expensive controls, and 
the relative ease of grandfathering existing emitters by allocating 
allowances to them.64  Like Churchill’s famous aphorism about 
democracy, cap-and-trade may also be “the worst form of 
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time[.]”65  The only other means to control carbon 
emissions would be either a traditional command-and-control 
allocation of permissible carbon emissions or a carbon tax.66  Either 
would be difficult to implement in our political and economic 
system. 
We have a carbon-based economy.  Fossil fuels power the vast 
majority of economic activity in this country.  Any command-and-
control system of regulating GHG emissions would require a 
governmental agency, or Congress itself, to allocate the currency of 
economic activity among different industries and industry 
participants.  Professor Richard Stewart has famously compared 
“command-and-control” regulation to Soviet-style central economic 
planning.67  In essence, a command-and-control system would 
require a centrally planned economic system.68  It is unlikely that 
 
62. See infra Part II. 
63. See Alan Murray, Why Key Executives are Warming to Legislation on Climate Change, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A10.  See generally, Christopher H. Schroeder, Global Warming and the 
Problem of Policy Innovation:  Lessons from the Early Environmental Movement, 39 ENVTL. L. 285, 
300–02 (2009). 
64. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:  The Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1544 (2007). 
65. The Official Report, House of Commons (5th Series), Nov. 11, 1947, vol. 444, cc. 
206–07. 
66. See supra notes 7–42 and accompanying text. 
67. Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation:  Central Planning Versus Market-
Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 547 (1992). 
68. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 276 (1997); Bruce A. 
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334 
(1985); Stewart, supra note 67, at 547; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and 
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2087 (1993).  Contra Daniel H. Cole & Peter 
Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient?  Institutions, Technology, and the 
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 887, 887 n.2 (1999) (disputing the characterization of “command-and-control” 
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such a system would be economically desirable or politically 
palatable.   
It is telling that the environmental quality based regulatory 
schemes of both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act have 
failed to achieve their environmental quality goals even after thirty-
five years of implementation.69  This failure has been due largely to 
the lack of political will to set emissions load levels and to make the 
necessary allocations among individual and industrial sources of 
pollutants.70 
A carbon tax suffers from similar defects as a means to achieve a 
specific level of emissions reductions.  A carbon tax works, in 
theory, similarly to emissions trading by sending a “price signal” to 
reduce carbon emissions to the appropriate level.71  Unlike a cap-
and-trade program, which requires setting the emissions cap at the 
proper scientific level to save the planet without overshooting and 
imposing unnecessary costs, a carbon tax faces the additional 
challenge of determining what level of tax will achieve the proper 
reduction in GHG emissions.72  In addition, a moral hazard attaches 
to carbon taxes:  by creating a governmental revenue stream, the 
taxing authorities end up with an interest in continuing some level 
of the very activity the tax is supposed to dissuade to avoid losing 
the revenue stream.73  A carbon tax at a level necessary to achieve 
the eighty-five percent reduction in GHG emissions that scientists 
agree is essential74 would not be possible politically.  For example, 
 
regulation as Soviet-style market control). 
69. Kenneth Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water 
Pollution Control Legislation:  Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 578–
80 (2005) (noting failure of Clean Water Act to achieve water quality goals); Alan Waltner, 
Paradise Delayed—The Continuing Saga of the Los Angeles Basin Federal Clean Air Implementation 
Plan, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247, 248 (1995) (noting California’s failure to meet air 
quality standards). 
70. Murchison, supra note 69, at 580; see Donald W. Stever, Waste Load Allocation, in LAW 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 13:10 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 2009) (noting 
political difficulties of implementing waste load allocations to achieve water quality 
standards). 
71. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 43, at 32. 
72. See Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions:  An Offset Policy for Slowing 
Global Warming, 22 ENVTL L. 623, 632 (1992). 
73. States’ conflicted positions in tobacco litigation settlements illustrate this moral 
hazard, which results from the states’ dependence on revenue streams generated by tobacco 
sales.  See Myron Levin, News Analysis, States’ Tobacco Settlement Has Failed to Clear the Air, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/nov/09/business/fi-
smoke9. 
74. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  MITIGATION,  
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gas prices would have to rise to many times their current levels to 
achieve this reduction, and it is unlikely that any politician would 
support a gasoline tax that high.75  Public resistance to higher 
gasoline taxes76 suggests that the public would resist carbon taxes 
that would significantly increase energy and transportation costs. 
The same political problem may ultimately doom any cap-and-
trade system as well, given that the necessary price point to achieve 
the reduction would be the same.  The difference is that under a 
tax, the politically answerable taxing authority sets the price point; 
with cap-and-trade, the market sets the price with a supply of 
emissions allocations that falls far short of current demand.  A cap-
and-trade system might be slightly more palatable, as there may be 
less political resistance to a market-based price over a government 
tax.  Ironically, polling shows that the public in the United States 
would prefer a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade system.77 
In sum, there are serious practical and ethical objections to an 
emissions trading system for GHG emissions.  The ethical 
objections focus primarily on the immorality of selling rights to 
perform an act perceived to be immoral—the incremental 
destruction of the global climate ecology.  Indeed, emissions 
trading has been compared to the sale of indulgences by the 
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, allowing sinners to enter 
heaven.78  However, there are strong practical reasons to favor such 
a system as the only means of controlling GHG emissions that has 
any chance of political success.  In any event, as a cap-and-trade 
emissions control scheme appears to be the most likely form of 
GHG regulation, and the ethical objections to such a scheme are 
premised, at least in part, on objections to the creation of private 
 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf. 
75. During the 2008 oil price spike, when gasoline prices in the United States doubled to 
$4 per gallon, vehicle miles traveled declined by only 1.8%.  See Clifford Krauss, Driving Less, 
Americans Finally React to Sting of Gas Prices, A Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/business/19gas.html.  Clearly, a tax rate 
that may be many times the current gasoline prices would be necessary to accomplish the 
eighty percent reduction in carbon emissions sought by mid-century. 
76. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu et al., Pollution Tax Heuristics:  An Empirical Study of 
Willingness to Pay Higher Gasoline Taxes, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3612 (2008). 
77. An August 2009 poll found that Americans preferred a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade 
system by a two to one margin.  See Ben Geman, Is a Carbon Tax Dead?, THE HILL, Dec. 1, 
2009, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/69941-is-a-carbon-tax-dead. 
78. See Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environmental Indulgences, 47 KYKLOS 573, 578–87 (1994). 
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rights in common public resources that undergird the public trust 
doctrine, consideration of the public trust doctrine’s application to 
a cap-and-trade emissions scheme is in order. 
II.  APPLICABILITY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO GREENHOUSE 
GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS  
The public trust doctrine holds that certain resources cannot be 
reduced to private ownership.  The doctrine’s roots trace back to 
late Roman times.  According to the Institutes of the Eastern 
Roman Emperor Justinian, “[b]y the law of nature, these things are 
common to mankind:  the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea.”79  English common law 
incorporated this principle, at least as applied to tidal navigable 
waters, holding that while title to the shoreline and navigable water 
rested in the King, he held such title in trust for the people, subject 
to the right of the public to access the waters for navigation and for 
fishing.80  This common law conception of the public trust doctrine 
served the public’s interest in free navigation and fishing. 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the scope and effect of the 
public trust doctrine in U.S. law.  U.S. judicial decisions have 
incorporated public trust doctrine into domestic law to varying 
degrees.81  Nevertheless, public trust doctrine in the United States 
remains amorphous both in its authoritativeness and application.  
Scholars disagree on the source of public trust law, whether it 
applies to limit federal government action, and whether it applies 
beyond the traditional public trust assets of navigable waters.82 
In an influential 1970 article, Professor Joseph Sax linked public 
trust doctrine to environmental protection, and argued for the use 
of public trust principles as a common law restraint on 
environmental degradation.83  The application of this doctrine has 
taken root to some degree in the United States as a common law 
restraint on environmental degradation, through both its 
 
79. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, § 2.1.1 at 55 (Paul Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987). 
80. See ROBERT E. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 182–83 (1967); Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1894); MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF 
TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 5–44 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787); STUART A. 
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 575, 892 (3d ed. 1888). 
81. See infra notes 86–114, 121–48, 161–81 and accompanying text. 
82. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
83. See generally Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:  Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
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procedural and substantive aspects.  Procedurally, the public trust 
doctrine has been applied to preclude alienation of parklands and 
other public trust resources without specific legislative 
authorization.  Thus, in a leading case, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a parks commission may not lease a 
dedicated natural park preserve for recreational development 
without explicit legislative authorization.84  Substantively, the public 
trust doctrine has been applied to preclude grants of private 
interests in navigable waters or shoreline to the exclusion of public 
rights of navigation and access.85  If the global atmospheric 
commons is seen as a public trust resource, these substantive limits 
might prohibit or restrict the contours of a cap-and-trade GHG 
control scheme that purports to grant private rights in the 
atmospheric resource. 
An assessment of the implications that the public trust doctrine 
for a GHG cap-and-trade program in the United States requires 
consideration (if not resolution) of issues surrounding the doctrine 
that are still a source of scholarly debate.  These surprisingly 
unresolved issues include:  (1) the doctrinal source of public trust 
limits on governmental action; (2) the applicability of public trust 
principles to federal legislation; and (3) the extension of the public 
trust doctrine beyond the traditional public trust zone of territorial 
navigable waters.  These issues are necessarily interrelated.  To 
determine whether public trust doctrine limits federal action, one 
must examine its doctrinal underpinnings in order to understand 
whether it provides a constitutional limit on the scope of legislation 
otherwise within Congress’ Commerce Clause or treaty powers.  
Even if public trust limits apply to congressional action, application 
to legislation granting private GHG pollution rights would require 
extension of the federal public trust doctrine beyond its traditional 
arena of navigable waters. 
In an attempt to resolve these issues, this Part examines the roots 
of public trust doctrine and its application in the United States.  It 
concludes that the public trust doctrine is a fundamental limit on 
sovereign power enforceable through the Tenth Amendment 
 
84. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966).  Professor Sax 
notes, “[p]ublic trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the 
public domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the 
legislative and administrative process.”  Sax, supra note 83, at 509. 
85. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton 
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292 (1936). 
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reservation of the rights of the people; that the public trust 
doctrine, as such, can limit congressional action; and that the 
public trust doctrine’s scope extends beyond the navigable waters 
to include other public trust assets, like the atmosphere, that by 
their nature are administered by the polity for the benefit of the 
people and cannot be alienated to private interests. 
A.  The Roots and Branches of Public Trust Doctrine 
A brief consideration of the history and doctrinal underpinnings 
of public trust doctrine in the United States helps resolve the 
question of its potential application to a cap-and-trade emissions 
control system.86  United States public trust doctrine traces its roots 
through English common law back to the Justinian Code.87  In the 
United States, reflections of public trust principles appear in both 
colonial legislation and acts of the early Congresses.  The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony’s Ordinances of 1641–1647 granted 
riparian landowners rights to build structures below the high water 
mark on tidal waters, but explicitly reserved the public trust right of 
the public to cross such underwater lands for navigation, fishing, 
and fowling.88  Similarly reflecting public trust navigation rights, in 
the Northwest Ordinance, Congress declared that the Mississippi 
and St. Lawrence Rivers should be “common highways, and forever 
free.”89 
The New Jersey Superior Court is credited with the first state 
articulation of public trust principles in Arnold v. Mundy.90  In that 
1821 decision, the court rejected a claim of trespass brought by the 
claimed proprietor of oyster beds located in tidal waters.  The court 
articulated the public trust principles inherited by the states, as well 
as their multiple roots in natural, civil, and common law: 
Every thing susceptible of property is considered as belonging to the 
 
86. For an excellent and thorough consideration of the history and development of 
public trust doctrine in the United States, see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the 
Public Trust:  Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 458–62 (1989).  See also Patricia 
E. Salkin, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine as a Management Tool over Public and Private Lands, 
4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (1994). 
87. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 458–62. 
88. See JACK ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
AMERICA’S COASTS 5–6 (1994). 
89.   Act of Mar. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (providing for the government of the territory 
northwest of the Ohio River). 
90. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); see Wilkinson, supra note 86, at n.103; Mank, supra 
note 3, at 85. 
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nation that possesses the country, and as forming the entire mass of 
its wealth.  But the nation does not possess all those things in the 
same manner . . . Those things not divided among the individuals still 
belong to the nation, and are called public property.  Of these, again, 
some are reserved for the necessities of the state, and are used for the 
public benefit, and those are called ‘the domain of the crown or of 
the republic’; others remain common to all the citizens, who take of 
them and use them, each according to his necessities, and according 
to the laws which regulate their use, and are called common 
property.  Of this latter kind, according to the writers upon the law of 
nature and of nations, and upon the civil law, are the air, the running 
water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts. 91 
This seminal opinion noted the practical difficulties of possession 
that interfere with the concept of title in public trust assets, and 
also introduced the usufructuary nature of private use of public 
trust assets: 
But inasmuch as the things which constitute this common property 
are things in which a sort of transient usufructuary possession, only, 
can be had; and inasmuch as the title to them and to the soil by 
which they are supported, and to which they are appurtenant, cannot 
well, according to the common law notion of title, be vested in all the 
people; therefore, the wisdom of that law has placed it in the hands 
of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and regulated for the 
common use and benefit.92 
Since the oyster beds claimed by the plaintiff in Arnold v. Mundy 
were, as a fishery, part of the trust held for public benefit, the 
Court held that the plaintiff in trespass had not acquired rights to 
the oyster beds either by colonial grant or by use.93 
Arnold v. Mundy adopted public trust principles into the common 
law of New Jersey as a limit on the scope of a riparian landowner’s 
claimed rights to lands under water and an implicit limit on the 
sovereign’s power to alienate those rights to private interests.  
Subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court federalized this 
public trust limit on the alienability of lands under water, though 
with considerable ambiguity about the source and authority of 
these limits.  In 1842 in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,94 the Supreme 
Court applied Arnold v. Mundy to resolve another New Jersey 
property dispute concerning ownership of oyster beds in Raritan 
 
91. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 49. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
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Bay, apparently as a matter of federal common law.95  In the 1894 
case Shively v. Bowlby,96 the Court applied public trust principles to 
limit the scope of a riparian property owner’s rights under a 
congressional grant of territorial property, as against the public 
trust rights of what subsequently became the State of Oregon.  The 
Shively decision was grounded in the “equal footing” doctrine—the 
idea that all states subsequently admitted to the Union enjoy the 
same sovereign rights as the original thirteen.97  Thus, Oregon was 
entitled to take sovereign title to its public trust lands on the same 
basis as original states such as New Jersey, and the prior 
congressional grants were presumed not to compromise the public 
trust assets of future states.  The Court left open, however, the 
possibility that a clearly expressed congressional intention to 
convey territorial public trust lands would be effective.98 
Perhaps the most dramatic application of the public trust 
doctrine by the Supreme Court (and certainly one of the most 
cited) came in the 1892 case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.99  
The Illinois legislature had previously granted rights to underwater 
lands comprising the entire Chicago waterfront to the Illinois 
Central Railroad.  A subsequent legislature declared this grant null 
and void, and rescinded it.  The railroad challenged the rescission 
as an unconstitutional taking of its property, and the Supreme 
Court upheld the legislature’s rescission, citing public trust 
principles as a limit on the nature of title held in lands under 
navigable water: 
But it is a title different in character from that which the State holds 
in lands intended for sale.  It is different from the title which the 
United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption 
and sale.  It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they 
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction 
or interference of private parties.100 
This passage from Illinois Central has been read, most famously by 
Professor Joseph Sax, as establishing public trust limits on 
 
95. The opinion does not explain the source of the legal principles it applies, and cites 
state common law cases freely.  Id. at 389. 
96. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
97. Id. at 26–28. 
98. Id. at 57–58. 
99.  Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
100. Id. at 452. 
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sovereign states’ power to alienate trust assets.101  Professor Sax 
reads Illinois Central as a judicial limit on the exercise of the State’s 
authority to dispose of public trust assets.102  According to Professor 
Sax, “When a state holds a resource which is available for the free 
use of the general public, a court will look with considerable 
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated 
either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject 
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”103 
This reading is problematic.  After all, Illinois Central did not hold 
unlawful anything the Illinois Legislature had accomplished.  
Rather, the Court simply accepted the subsequent legislature’s 
recapture of the public trust lands as being consistent with Illinois 
public trust principles that prevented the railroad from having 
acquired valid title in the first place.104  The case simply did not 
arise in the posture of a public-interested challenge to the grant of 
public trust assets to exclusively private interests, and accordingly 
does not stand for a robust judicially enforced limit on grants in 
violation of the public trust.  Rather, the case arose as a claim by 
that putative grantee of the public trust asset.  The Court’s holding 
that the purported grant was voidable by the State is not quite a 
holding that the purported grant was void ab initio. 
The Supreme Court subsequently characterized Illinois Central as 
a simple application of Illinois law governing the scope of rights 
that might be acquired in a state grant of public trust lands.  In 
Appleby v. City of New York,105 the Court rejected a claim that the 
public trust principles established in Illinois Central precluded an 
effective grant of the state’s public trust interest (“jus publicum”) in 
lands under water.106  The plaintiff in Appleby sought to enjoin the 
City of New York from dredging and wharfing boats in a previously 
deeded area comprising a limited portion of the Hudson River 
waterfront.  In rejecting the City’s public trust defense to a federal 
Contract Clause claim, the Supreme Court limited Illinois Central to 
the situation where a state sought to divest itself of a substantial 
portion of the public trust resource.107  The Court further 
 
101. Sax, supra note 83, at 489–90. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 490. 
104. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 462–63. 
105. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). 
106. Id. at 396. 
107. Id. at 393–94. 
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characterized Illinois Central as a statement of Illinois common law, 
not a statement of federal principles limiting the permissible scope 
of state action.108 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions similarly treat public trust 
principles as state empowerment, not as a limit on state sovereign 
action.  For example, in a 1994 case, Phillips Petroleum v. 
Mississippi,109 the Supreme Court applied public trust doctrine to 
uphold Mississippi’s claimed right to grant oil and gas leases as 
against those claiming title to the underlying lands, even while 
extending the scope of public trust lands to include non-tidal 
navigable lands.110  Commentators have likewise viewed the public 
trust doctrine as one that may empower states to regulate coastal 
environmental resources free from liability for takings claims.111  
Under this view, public trust doctrine is one of the “background 
principles” of common law that inhere in title and limit the rights 
for which a property owner may seek compensation under the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.112  The Court has 
generally eschewed any claim that public trust doctrine constitutes 
a federal limit on the alienability of public trust resources, 
explaining, instead, that the federal “equal footing” doctrine places 
public trust lands equally in the ownership of each state at the 
outset, subject to each state’s disposition of the public trust assets 
according to its own common law rules.113  According to the Court 
in Phillips Petroleum, states can “define the limits of the lands held in 
public trust and . . . recognize private rights in such lands as they 
see fit.”114 
Despite this dictum by the Supreme Court, many commentators 
continue to view public trust doctrine as one that limits the scope 
of permissible State alienation of trust property.  The leader among 
these academics is Professor Joseph Sax, who argued in 1970 that 
public trust doctrine would be a fruitful vehicle to enforce 
 
108. Id. at 395 (referring to Illinois Central as a case which “arose in the Circuit Court of 
the United States, and the conclusion reached was necessarily a statement of Illinois law”). 
109. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
110. Id. at 479. 
111. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of 
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 367 (2005); 
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993). 
112. See sources cited supra note 111. 
113. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472–74. 
114. Id. at 475. 
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environmental values through existing common law doctrine.115  
Other commentators have taken up Professor Sax’s call to rely on 
public trust doctrine to advance environmental values judicially, 
while expanding the doctrinal basis of the public trust from 
common law to constitutional status.  These commentators have 
relied on various constitutional and federalism doctrines to support 
the notion that public trust principles are of national dimension 
and are thus superior to contrary state law.116  Thus, Richard 
Epstein has argued that public trust limits on state action inhere in 
Equal Protection principles, as well as in the converse of the 
Takings Clause:  grants of unequal rights to public resources 
deprive other persons equal protection of the law, and the same 
principle that requires compensation for the taking of private 
property precludes inadequately compensated grants of public 
assets.117  Other commentators have placed the source of public 
trust limits in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution as an 
aspect of the implied guarantee of free navigation underlying 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.118  Others define the public 
trust doctrine as a vestige of federal common law, permissible in 
the absence of federal legislation even after Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins and Swift v. Tyson.119  One commentator finds federally 
enforceable public trust limits in natural law incorporated through 
penumbras and emanations of the Ninth Amendment to the 
Constitution.120 
The Illinois Central decision explicitly grounded public trust limits 
 
115. See generally Sax, supra note 83.  For a critique of Sax, see Richard Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:  Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643–44 (1986); see also, e.g., 1 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  
AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 162 (1986) (arguing for strict scrutiny of state actions affecting 
public trust resources); Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil:  Breathing Life into the Public 
Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 41–49 (2000) (arguing for extension of public 
trust doctrine to protect wildlife); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common 
Lands Concept:  A “Commons” Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
361, 377–79 (1974); Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 426 n.3; Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver 
Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone:  Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, 
and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 47–50 (2009); Hope 
Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine:  Ride ’Em Charlie Tuna, 26 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54–60 (2007). 
116. See infra notes 117–20. 
117. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 422–28 (1987). 
118. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 458–62. 
119. Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 47–48; Babcock, supra note 115, at 11. 
120. See generally George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Natural Law:  Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006). 
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in notions of state sovereignty, holding that “[t]he State can no 
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it 
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government 
and the preservation of the peace.”121  Some observers draw on this 
language to suggest that public trust principles are enforceable as 
inherent essentials of state sovereignty.122  While Illinois Central 
relied on this inherent attribute of state sovereignty to limit the 
permissible scope of alienation of trust assets, other Supreme Court 
decisions have similarly relied on essential principles of state 
sovereignty to empower states under public trust principles.123  The 
idea that public trust limits and powers inhere in the very nature of 
sovereignty is one consistent thread in public trust cases. 
The Supreme Court relied on such unwritten notions of 
sovereignty, not incorporated by any specific constitutional 
provision, to strike down congressional legislation imposing duties 
on state officers in Printz v. United States.124  Public trust principles 
have been described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across 
cultures125 and across millennia.126  Therefore, the Court’s reasoning 
in Printz—that essential attributes of state sovereignty limit 
congressional impositions—equally supports the notion that 
similarly essential aspects of government sovereignty, such as the 
public trust doctrine, provide a limit on government alienation of 
trust assets.  This limit is equally enforceable as part of the social 
contract underlying the constitutional bargains of federalism and 
popular sovereignty.  This notion finds textual support in the 
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of rights not granted to the 
federal government “to the States respectively, or to the People.”127 
The Supreme Court has also suggested the existence of 
inherently sovereign rights of “the people” that are not abrogated 
 
121. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
122. See James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates?  Idaho’s Statutory Limitation 
on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91, 115–16 (1997) (citing Ariz. Ctr. for Law in 
the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)); see also Turnipseed et al., 
supra note 115, at 44–46 (arguing that public trust duties inhere in sovereignty). 
123. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
124. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997). 
125. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 429–30 (recounting that public rights of water use, 
including navigation and fishing, are recognized in Asian, African, and Islamic societies). 
126. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79. 
127. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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by the role of states in the federal system.  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton,128 the Court held that the Tenth Amendment only 
reserves to states those sovereign powers in existence at the time of 
founding of the United States, and that it reserved to the people 
those aspects of sovereignty not residing in the states.  Thornton 
struck down a state attempt to add to the constitutional 
qualifications for members of Congress, holding that no such 
aspect of sovereignty existed at the time of the nation’s founding, 
and thus no such right was reserved to the states.129  The decision 
thus provides additional support for the notion that there exist 
enforceable norms limiting the scope of sovereign powers, and that 
reservation of state sovereignty by the Tenth Amendment does not 
abrogate pre-existing rights of the people.  Since public trust 
doctrine is a pre-existing limit on the scope of state sovereignty, 
Thornton suggests that the pre-existing rights of the people in trust 
assets—at a minimum, rights to navigation and fishing—are 
reserved by the Tenth Amendment. 
Like the inherently sovereign right of “the people” to choose the 
qualifications of their representatives, public trust limits inhere in 
sovereignty, and these limits are reserved to the people. 
B.  Public Trust Doctrine Limits on Federal Legislative Action  
The public trust doctrine has implications for a congressionally 
enacted GHG cap-and-trade program only to the extent that the 
public trust doctrine places limits on federal legislative actions.  If 
public trust doctrine only restricts the authority of individual states 
to alienate public trust assets, then congressional action would be 
immune from any challenge based on public trust principles.  
Whether the public trust doctrine applies to federal legislative 
action remains an open question.  The Supreme Court’s doctrine 
has, to date, arisen solely in the context of states’ rights to public 
trust assets, leading some to suggest that congressional action is 
immune from the limitations under the public trust doctrine.130  
 
128. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that the Tenth 
Amendment only reserves to states those sovereign powers in existence at the time of 
founding of the United States, and reserves to the people those aspects of sovereignty not 
residing in the States). 
129. Id. at 801–02. 
130. See Eric Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 173, 175 (2004); Lazarus, supra note 115, at 633–34. 
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Lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions about the 
application of the public trust doctrine to federally acquired 
lands.131  Commentators, however, urge the extension of the public 
trust to actions of federal agencies and Congress.132  The extent to 
which the public trust limits federal action turns on the question 
addressed in the previous section:  what is legal source of those 
limits?  If the public trust doctrine is solely a matter of common 
law, then Congress may vary those limits at will, at least within the 
scope of Congress’ enumerated powers.  If, on the other hand—as 
this author believes—the public trust is essential to the nature of 
sovereignty and encompasses rights reserved to the people 
generally, then the doctrine applies equally to the sovereign federal 
government as it does to the sovereign state governments. 
Those who suggest that public trust does not apply to federal 
legislative action draw support from the doctrine’s ambiguous 
precedential background.  First, the development of public trust 
doctrine has been almost entirely in the context of public trust 
limits and powers of states.133  Phillips Petroleum suggests that under 
the “equal footing doctrine,” all states inherit the same public trust 
baseline assets.134  Following that baseline, however, each state may 
develop its own law and doctrine establishing the scope and limits 
of the public trust.135  One commentator has thus suggested that 
there is not one public trust doctrine in the United States, but 
rather fifty-one public trust doctrines—one for each state plus a 
federal doctrine.136  The Supreme Court has never determined the 
existence of a federal public trust doctrine as a limit on 
congressional action; nonetheless, in cases like Shively v. Bowlby it 
has applied public trust principles to interpret the scope of 
congressional grants.137 
Second, lower federal courts have reached conflicting 
conclusions about the existence of federal public trust 
responsibilities.  Three noteworthy decisions directly address the 
issue:  two suggest that the federal government holds public trust 
assets subject to the traditional public trust in navigation and 
 
131. See infra notes 138–45. 
132. See infra notes 146–50. 
133. See supra Part II.A. 
134. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988). 
135. Id. at 483 (quoting Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)). 
136. See Wilkinson, supra note 86, at 425. 
137. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
  
314 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:2 
 
fishing access, while another rejects this trust limitation.  In U.S. v. 
1.58 Acres of Land,138 the District of Massachusetts held land that the 
federal government acquired by condemnation to build a Coast 
Guard station was taken subject to the state public trust, preserving 
public rights to access for fishing and navigation below the high 
water line.139  The Northern District of California followed this 
reasoning in City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards,140 holding that the 
federal government takes title to tidelands subject to public trust 
responsibilities and may not convey such tidelands to a private 
party.141  Contrary to this result, another Northern District of 
California decision, United States v. 11.037 Acres, held that under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution142 the federal government 
condemns and eliminates all property interests when it takes state 
land, including public trust interests.143 
Other federal courts have considered the public trust doctrine, 
applying its principles to empower federal agencies to protect 
communitarian public trust values rather than placing limitations 
on federal action.  Thus, a federal district court held that the 
federal government shares in the responsibility to protect public 
trust interests in wildlife, permitting the federal government to sue 
for natural resource damages where an oil spill killed 10,000 
migratory birds.144  Other federal authorities have located federal 
control over use and disposition of navigable waters in the Property 
Clause of the Constitution, even in the absence of federal 
ownership of the underlying lands.145  These authorities suggest that 
public trust doctrine has some bearing on federal actions, though 
they do not stand directly for restrictions on federal action. 
Despite this ambiguous precedential background, many 
commentators argue for application of public trust principles to 
 
138.  U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 121 (D. Mass. 1981). 
139. Id. at 124–25. 
140. City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards, 635 F.Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
141. Id. at 1450. 
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. 
143. United States v. 11.037 Acres, 685 F.Supp. 214, 216–17 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
144. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22, 38–39 
(1947); General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service and 
National Park System Units in Alaska, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,133, 35,134 (July 5, 1996) (to be 
codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1, 13) (asserting Commerce and Property Clause jurisdiction to 
regulate waters in National Parks where the United States does not hold title to submerged 
lands); see generally Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 43–44. 
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federal actions involving public trust resources.  Recent 
commentary has urged the extension of public trust principles to 
limit exploitation of fishery resources and aquaculture in ocean 
waters under federal control beyond the territorial sea.146  Other 
commentators have urged application of public trust principles to 
federal programs as diverse as national parks administration147 and 
the broadcast radio spectrum.148 
The resolution of the question discussed in the preceding 
Section—the provenance of public trust doctrine—bears on 
whether the doctrine applies as a judicially enforceable limit on the 
scope of federal action.  A public trust doctrine born of state 
common law, or as an implied Dormant Commerce Clause limit on 
the exercise of state power,149 would not pose any limits on the 
scope of permissible federal action.  A public trust doctrine rooted 
in federal common law, or as a fundamental concept of sovereignty 
enforceable as part of the basic constitutional political contract, 
should be federally enforceable.  As discussed in the previous 
section, this author believes public trust limits are inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty and are therefore enforceable as limits on 
federal action.150 
Nevertheless, such application of public trust doctrine to limit 
federal action would be a judicial innovation.  As noted earlier, 
federal courts have yet to strike down any federal legislative or 
regulatory action as a violation of public trust principles.151  Some 
observers question whether public trust doctrine limits federal 
action at all,152 while those arguing for expansion of the doctrine 
cannot agree on its doctrinal underpinnings.153  Some courts resort 
to public trust concepts in evaluating issues of environmental law 
without considering whether public trust doctrine creates any 
 
146. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 52–58 (describing fishery resources); 
Babcock, supra note 115, at 54–60. 
147. See generally Peter Egan, Applying Public Trust Tests to Congressional Attempts to Close 
National Park Areas, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 717 (1998). 
148. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 547–50 (2002); 
Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource 
Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004). 
149. See supra Part II.A. 
150. Id. 
151. See supra Part II.B. 
152. See generally Pearson, supra note 130; Lazarus, supra note 115.  
153. See supra Part II.B. 
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judicially enforceable limitations on federal action.154  These 
authorities suggest that public trust principles might be a form of 
“soft” law, providing guidance rather than enforceable limits.  Even 
if the public trust doctrine is not a “hard” law enforceable limit on 
federal action, public trust principles may still be brought to bear 
on the acceptability and the interpretation of a cap-and-trade 
system of tradable rights to the atmosphere’s GHG absorption 
capacity.  Whether or not treated as “hard” law, the public trust 
plays a role in the construction and interpretation of putative 
grants of public assets.  Thus, the Supreme Court in Shively v. 
Bowlby relied on public trust principles to find that Congress had 
not, through pre-statehood legislation, granted private rights to 
tidelands in Oregon.155  Similarly, some states, such as 
Massachusetts, have adopted a public trust doctrine that is 
essentially procedural, requiring a “clear statement” in the form of 
an explicit authorization of the alienation in question for a 
legislative grant of private interests in public trust assets to be 
effective.156  Public trust principles might thus form a rule of 
construction for a cap-and-trade program, limiting the scope of any 
private rights obtained. 
Finally, even if not binding, public trust principles provide a 
useful metric for assessing the appropriateness of a cap-and-trade 
program in light of evidence of their acceptance in various cultures 
and throughout history.  Public trust is as frequently invoked as a 
moral or ethical principle as it is a legal one, particularly in the case 
of legacy, cultural, and environmental resources.  The ethical 
argument proceeds on the principle that no given generation of 
lawmakers and government has the authority to compromise legacy 
resources that have been enriching humanity for generations and 
to which future generations have an equal claim.157  Thus, public 
trust principles have been invoked to protect works of art, cultural 
artifacts, archeological treasures, and paleontology resources.158  
 
154. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text. 
155.  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
156. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966). 
157. See generally Mank, supra note 3. 
158. See, e.g., Wis.’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 340 N.W.2d 722 (Wis. 
1983) (stating public trust doctrine applies to historical resources); Wade v. Kramer, 459 
N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stating archeological remains are subject to public trust 
protections); San Diego County Archaeological Soc’y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting claim that the public trust doctrine should be extended to 
cover archeological remains located on private property); Ellen R. Porges, Protecting the Public 
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Whether or not public trust limits are legally binding in a way that 
prevents Congress from adopting a cap-and-trade system of 
allocating GHG pollution allowances, the cultural and 
environmental legacy underpinnings of the ethical public trust 
argument apply with political and moral force to any congressional 
undertaking in this area. 
C.  Extending the Federal Public Trust Doctrine Beyond Navigable 
Waters to the Atmosphere  
Traditionally, the federal public trust doctrine has been applied 
solely to trust interests in navigable waters and associated 
tidelands.159  Thus, application of public trust principles to a federal 
cap-and-trade program depends on expansion of the doctrine to 
cover air resources implicated in management of the global climate 
system.  Even though the federal public trust doctrine has not been 
judicially extended beyond navigable waters and tidelands, the 
doctrine’s Justinian roots explicitly included rights in the “air.”160  
State judicial decisions have already extended public trust interests 
well beyond the arena of navigable waters to resources such as 
parks, archeological sites, and water resources.161  Many 
commentators urge that federal public trust doctrine should 
likewise be extended.162 
Under English common law, public trust responsibilities were 
limited to tidal waters.163  The United States Supreme Court 
extended the doctrine to include waters that were navigable but 
not tidally influenced, including the vast reaches of the Great Lakes 
and America’s freshwater river systems.164  In Phillips Petroleum, the 
Court also extended the doctrine to include lands underlying 
 
Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 122 (1981) (arguing for public trust interest in preserving the 
integrity of art work).  See generally William Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust:  
Process-based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive 
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 402 (1997); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and 
Cultural Property:  The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 
(1995). 
159. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text. 
160. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79, at 55. 
161. See infra notes 167–70. 
162. See, e.g., supra notes 111–12, 115–20 and accompanying text; infra note 170. 
163. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821). 
164. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 
(1977); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 
U.S. 443, 451 (1852). 
  
318 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:2 
 
waters that are tidal, but non-navigable.165  No federal decision has 
yet made the leap from waters to other potential trust resources, at 
least in the absence of a statutory scheme incorporating trust 
principles.166 
State decisions, on the other hand, have extended public trust 
responsibilities well beyond the high tide mark and common law 
trust interests in waters, fishing, and navigation.  This expansion 
has been both physical and conceptual.  Physically, states have 
expanded the application of public trust doctrine from the near 
shore, such as beach access, to water resources unrelated to 
navigation and to resources such as public parkland having nothing 
to do with water at all.167  Some states have gone even further, 
applying public trust principles to environmental and cultural 
heritage resources, such as the unique ecosystem of Mono Lake in 
California168 and archeological remains.169  States also apply public 
trust principles to wildlife resources.170 
Along with this geographic expansion of public trust principles 
beyond the water’s edge, states have expanded communitarian 
interests subject to the public trust beyond the immediate 
utilitarian interests in commercial navigation and fishing.  Thus, 
courts have recognized the preservation of tidelands as a public 
trust value,171 as well as the recreational interests in access to 
 
165. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 489–92 (1988). 
166. Cf. In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980) (applying 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 
(2006)).  See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 
(applying the doctrine to protect areas surrounding redwood forests based on the National 
Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–18 (2006), and Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
79a–79q (2006)). 
167. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) 
(holding that public access to dry-sand beach was part of the public trust right to access to 
water); see also Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 
(N.Y. 2001) (stating parks are “impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the people”); 
see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000) (applying public 
trust doctrine to all water in the state), aff’d in part and vacated on unrelated grounds in part by 
In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 105 Haw. 1 (2004). 
168. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (Cal. 1983). 
169. See generally Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that 
archeological remains are subject to public trust protections). 
170. See generally People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897) (recognizing fish as 
public trust resources); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
588, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (finding public trust includes wild birds); Michael C. Blumm & 
Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust:  The American Rule of Capture and State 
Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 655, 693–96 (2005). 
171. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 
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navigable waters.172  The leading case is the California Supreme 
Court decision in Marks v. Whitney, where the court held that the 
reserved public trust interest precluded development of a marina 
in tidelands that had been granted to a private owner by the state.  
The court specifically recognized environmental services as public 
trust values: 
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible 
to encompass changing public needs.  In administering the trust the 
state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one 
mode of utilization over another . . . . There is a growing public 
recognition that one of the most important public uses of the 
tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the 
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may 
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.173 
These cases recognizing the ecosystem service values of public trust 
resources are particularly relevant to application of public trust 
principles to a cap-and-trade scheme.  Just as the California 
Supreme Court considered the pollution control and habitat values 
of tidal wetlands to prevent development of those wetlands that 
would impair those public benefit functions, a court may consider 
the overall carbon cycling functions of the global atmospheric 
ecosystem in assessing whether over-allocation of emissions rights 
would impair this ecological system. 
These state court cases, as well as the origins of public trust 
doctrine, support extension of public trust principles to include 
atmospheric resources.  The state common law origins of the 
public trust doctrine trace the doctrine’s roots to the Institutes of 
the Emperor Justinian; recall that Justinian’s statement of the 
public trust principle specifically included “the air” among the 
assets held in common for the benefit of all mankind.174  While 
English common law may have limited its recognition of public 
 
761, 769 (Wis. 1972). 
172. See, e.g., Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998) (finding 
preservation of recreational use of stream previously used for commerce is a public trust 
value); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) 
(holding that recreational use of beach falls within the public trust); Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259–
60 (finding trust purposes include hunting, bathing, and swimming); Orion Corp. v. 
Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072–73 (Wash. 1987) (stating public trust interests include 
swimming, water skiing, and other recreational purposes), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988). 
173.  Marks, 6 Cal. 3d. at 259–60. 
174. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79, at 55. 
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trust resources to navigable tidal waters,175 United States decisions 
did not hesitate to extend the doctrine to non-tidal navigable 
waters based on the exigencies of the new world. 
Moreover, the navigable waters development of public trust 
doctrine at common law was not necessarily a limit on the scope of 
potential trust assets.  Public trust doctrine has been based on the 
idea that public trust assets were “res communes,” that is, they were 
simply physically incapable of being converted to private 
ownership.176  Once the res communes became susceptible to private 
ownership, but as yet unappropriated (so-called res nullius),177 the 
potential limitations on private ownership under the public trust 
doctrine became relevant.  For example, as waters were privatized 
the public trust doctrine restrictions on these assets were 
applicable.178 
Similarly, as governments seek to privatize rights to atmospheric 
assets through tradable emissions rights, the public trust doctrine 
should naturally extend to protect previously unpossessable 
interests in the atmosphere commons. 
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has not explicitly applied 
public trust doctrine beyond its common law boundaries of tidal 
and navigable waters, it has recognized public trust-like rights in 
airspace.  The federal airspace public trust doctrine evolved, in 
part, from recognition of an implied federal navigational easement 
through navigable waters.179  Sixty years ago, in United States v. 
Causby, the Supreme Court recognized a navigational servitude in 
the airspace above private property, much like the navigational 
 
175. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821). 
176. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Public Domain: Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators:  
Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003). 
177. Id. 
178. Arnold v. Mundy and Illinois Central are both examples of cases where public trust 
principles were called into play by an assertion of private rights in navigable waters that were 
previously not subject to such ownership. 
179. See generally Benjamin Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the Foreshore”:  The 
Federal Navigational Servitude and its Origins in State Public Trust Doctrine, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
471 (2002); Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust:  An Historical Analysis, 1 
SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common 
Law:  Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal 
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael L. Rosen, Public 
and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters:  The Governmental/Proprietary 
Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561 (1982); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust:  A Sovereign’s Ancient 
Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980). 
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servitude applied by the public trust doctrine to waters overlying 
privately owned submerged lands.180  Causby held that a property 
owner could not enjoin aircraft flights over his property, even 
though such a navigational servitude was certainly unknown at 
common law.181  Thus, Causby represents the evolution of public 
trust-like principles to adapt to technological and social changes 
that made usable what was previously unpossessable (and un-
occupiable). 
D.  Inclusion of Atmospheric Resources in the Public Trust  
As technology, and the potential for cap-and-trade, makes aspects 
of the atmosphere subject to private ownership, the public trust 
doctrine should similarly evolve to include these interests in the 
public trust responsibilities of the sovereign, such as creating the 
system of private rights.  The Justinian statement of public trust 
principles, which included the air and wild animals as well as 
“running water,”182 may have been as much a descriptive statement 
of human lack of dominion over these resources as a prescriptive 
statement of government’s legal disability to dispose of them.  As 
civilization exercises increasing dominion over the Justinian list of 
trust assets, the law has developed to enforce societal expectations 
in the commonality and permanence of these public resources. 
The concept of tradable emissions rights is just the latest in a 
series of juridical rights in previously un-allocated resources.  
Whether denominated as property grants or not, tradable 
emissions rights bear all the classical hallmarks of a property 
interest:  they entitle the owner to a bundle of rights, specifically 
the right to emit a specified amount of GHGs.  Like traditional 
property interests, they have an element of exclusivity—their value 
depends in part on their scarcity.  Tradable emissions rights 
without a scarcity-creating “cap” would have no value, as the value 
of an emissions allowance comes from the right to engage in 
conduct that would otherwise be prohibited.  And like traditional 
property interests, they are tradable.  The fact that these rights are 
a “new” form of property likewise does not exclude them from 
public trust consideration, as public trust doctrine has developed, 
in part, to protect previously communal assets from encroachment 
 
180. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
181. Id. at 260–61. 
182. See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79. 
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by similarly “new” property rights in lands under water. 
The fact that emissions allowances are a human technological 
construct does not render them any less a property interest, nor 
does it necessarily defeat their treatment as public trust assets.  The 
existence of tradable emissions rights may depend on technologies 
allowing for measurement, monitoring, and enforcement of these 
emissions and rights.  However, the existence of rights in lands 
under water at some point depended on the (much simpler) 
technology of filling in tidelands and enforcing rights to exclude 
people from areas that were previously navigable.  As noted, the 
public trust doctrine in the New World expanded from tidal 
waterways to all navigable waters because of the extensive network 
of non-tidal waters essential to navigation that would otherwise be 
immune from public trust protection.183  The Supreme Court has 
recognized a public trust-like interest of the public in air 
navigation, in derogation of pre-existing common law property 
rights.184  It is not a great leap to include individual atmospheric 
emissions allocations, as would be created under a cap-and-trade 
regulatory scheme, within the ambit of quasi-property grants that 
might conflict with the communal, previously unallocated interest 
in the air. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC TRUST FOR A GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM  
Thus, in its broadest conception, the public trust doctrine may be 
a legal handle for principled objections to the creation of tradable 
property rights in air pollution allocations.  Emperor Justinian 
included “the air” in his list of common resources absolutely not 
subject to private ownership.185  Professor Kirk Junker has suggested 
that public trust doctrine might be a means of enforcing ethical 
objections to emissions trading schemes.186  Professor Gerald Torres 
relied on public trust principles to argue that under a cap-and-
trade scheme, government must not give away pollution 
allocations, but, as trustee, must account for the “profits” implicit in 
the sale or transfer of such allocations by collecting the market 
 
183. See In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F.Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
184. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
185. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 79. 
186. Junker, supra note 59, at 162. 
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value of such allocations.187 
At the extreme, a public trust argument against emissions trading 
would hold that tradable pollution rights are simply illegal as a 
violation of the public trust in the air resources and the absolute 
inalienability of this public trust resource.  However, the mature 
public trust doctrine that is established in the United States is not 
this extreme.  As the above review of the doctrine’s development 
suggests, the public trust doctrine has never been applied in the 
United States as an absolute prohibition against alienation of 
public trust resources.188  Likewise, the Supreme Court, in Appleby v. 
City of New York, made clear that legislative grants of land under 
water and private filling of these waters to create developable land 
is permissible so long as the rights granted do not substantially 
interfere with public trust values.189  In the Illinois Central case as 
well as others, the public trust doctrine has been applied only to 
preclude the alienation of a substantial portion of the public trust 
asset to private hands.  Like the converse situation of public 
regulation of private lands, grants of public trust assets are invalid 
only when they go “too far.”190 
Therefore, even though the public trust doctrine does not 
preclude the use of tradable pollution limits, the doctrine does 
have implications for the cap-and-trade proposals currently on the 
table to the extent that they go too far, or not far enough.  So, 
when does the purported grant of a public trust resource offend 
the public trust doctrine?  There is a legacy principle at work 
here—an attempt to alienate public resources goes “too far” when 
it deprives future generations of essential, irreplaceable resources.  
Thus, the grant of a limited area under water to build a pier, or to 
fill land for a development, is not a violation of public trust 
(Appleby), but the grant of the entire shoreline of a city (as in Illinois 
Central), depriving future generations of any opportunity to 
develop piers and navigation facilities, is a violation of public trust.  
The grant of water rights in general does not violate public trusts, 
but the grant of water rights to the extent that a unique and 
irreplaceable natural resource like Mono Lake will be destroyed 
 
187. Torres, supra note 148, at 560–65. 
188. See supra Part II. 
189. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 401–03 (1926). 
190. See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).  But cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–28 (1978) (establishing balancing test for determining 
when public regulation constitutes a taking). 
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does violate public trust. 
Indeed, the Mono Lake decision, National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court of Alpine County, hints at an instructive analogy.191  
Even while rejecting an absolute application of public trust 
principles, in favor of a balancing test, the Court noted that “[t]he 
state must have the power to grant non-vested usufructuary rights 
to appropriate water even if diversions harm public trust uses” in 
describing the water rights that might be validly conveyed.192  This 
reference to usufructuary rights suggests that, although the state 
may allocate the sustainable fruits of public trust assets, it may not 
allocate rights in the underlying resource itself.  To put the matter 
in conventional trust terms—the sovereign, as trustee, may 
distribute the income of public trust assets, but may not sell off the 
corpus. 
This view of the public trust doctrine brings an element of 
sustainability and intergenerational equity to the limits imposed by 
the public trust.  The ethical and political arguments for current 
action to control GHG emissions are founded on similar notions of 
intergenerational equity.193  Under this manifestation of public trust 
principles, the sovereign may alienate portions of the resources 
held in public trust, but may not do so to the extent that the 
alienation interferes with the essential legacy attributes that make 
the resource a public trust.  Under this conception of the public 
trust doctrine, there is no absolute objection to creating a cap-and-
trade program and it permits partial alienation of resources held in 
public trust.  However, since this alienation cannot interfere with 
essential legacy attributes, the cap in the program must be set at an 
ecologically sound level.194  This section will explore the 
 
191. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983). 
192. Id. at 426. 
193. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and 
International Law, in IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:  INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON 
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 345–51 (1989), reprinted in 9 VT. J. ENVTL L. 
615 (2008). 
194. The issues of what levels of carbon dioxide equivalencies in the global atmosphere 
and what global temperature increase are sustainable is beyond the scope of this Article.  
This Article uses the IPCC Targets for a 2° Celsius change as a proxy for sustainability, 
although some have argued that this is even too great an increase.  See generally 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT 
(2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.  This 
Article, however, does not argue for a “right” to a given atmospheric condition; rather, it 
argues for a sustainability limit on how we divvy up and sell the atmospheric commons.  
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usufructuary and sustainability principles underlying public trust 
law.  Then, it applies these public trust principles to GHG cap-and-
trade, defining the limits that public trust places on it. 
A.  The Usufructuary Thread in Public Trust Law 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “usufruct” means 
“[t]he right to use another’s property for a time without damaging or 
diminishing it, although the property might naturally deteriorate 
over time.”195  The definition of usufruct thus has a built-in 
sustainability principle:  the holder of usufructuary rights can only 
exploit the fruits of the property, and must not under any 
circumstances impair the productivity of the underlying asset.  
Usufructuary rights should thus be sustainable in perpetuity.  The 
interest is analogous to the interest of an income beneficiary of a 
conventional trust:  the trustee may pay out the “profits” of the 
trust, but must not invade the corpus. 
This term of trust law has been used to describe the limits on 
exploitation of public trust assets since the founding of the United 
States.  In a 1789 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson 
rejected the possibility that one generation might bind or 
compromise the interests of future generations, insisting, 
I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, “that the 
earth belongs in usufruct to the living” . . . For if [a member of the 
present generation] could, he might, during his own life, eat up the 
usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the 
lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be 
the reverse of our principle . . .196 
Similarly, the first New World judicial decision establishing public 
trust principles, Arnold v. Mundy, invoked the usufruct principle.  
According to Mundy, public trust assets “are things in which a sort 
of transient usufructuary possession, only, can be had.”197 
More recent authorities, in addition to the Mono Lake decision, 
continue to invoke the idea that only the usufruct of public trust 
assets may be allocated to private interests.  For example, in 
declaring water resources generally to be subject to public trust 
principles, the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly relied on “the 
 
195. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). 
196. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958). 
197. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 49 (1821). 
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king’s authority to ‘enforce the usufructs of the land for the 
common good . . . .’”198  Similarly relying on this principle of 
usufruct, the Hawaiian Supreme Court subsequently held that the 
grant of water rights was a grant of the usufruct only, and that 
ownership of the water in the streams remained in the state as a 
public trust asset for the common benefit.199 
B.  The Sustainability Principle Underlying Public Trust 
These invocations of the usufruct principle in public trust law 
reveal a larger principle of sustainability and intergenerational 
equity underlying the administration of public trust assets.  Indeed, 
the root of the term “usufruct” itself represents a form of 
intergenerational equity, as a “usufructuary” title to land at Roman 
law was a life estate only.200  Other public trust decisions in the 
United States similarly incorporate sustainability principles as limits 
on the scope of private rights in public trust assets, including even 
interests in land.  For example, in applying public trust principles 
to uphold limits on the development of wetlands, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court explicitly referred to sustainable development 
practices: 
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change 
its nature to suit any of his purposes?  The great forests of our state 
were stripped on the theory man’s ownership was unlimited.  But in 
forestry, the land at least was used naturally, only the natural fruit of 
the land (the trees) were taken.  The despoilage was in the failure to 
look to the future and provide for the reforestation of the land.  An 
owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the 
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for 
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights 
of others.  The exercise of the police power in zoning must be 
reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that 
power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private 
property to its natural uses.201 
The Mono Lake decision likewise invoked environmental heritage 
resources as an interest served by the public trust doctrine, and 
required that these heritage interests of future generations be 
protected, noting that: 
 
198. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982). 
199. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1339 (Haw. 1973). 
200. N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV. 1265 
(1994) (arguing civil law defines “life estate” as “usufructuary”). 
201. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972). 
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[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of a state power to use 
the public property for public purposes.  It is an affirmation of the 
duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, 
marshland and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only 
in rare cases where abandonment of that right is consistent with the 
purposes of the trust.202 
These decisions, which invoke the principles of usufructuary rights 
and “common heritage,” demonstrate that there is a sustainability 
principle at work in the public trust doctrine.  Under these 
decisions, actions of a legislature or state agency at any given time 
must not deprive future generations and legislatures of their 
freedom of action or of their right, equal to the current 
generation, to sustainable fisheries, commercial navigation, and, 
according to later decisions (e.g., Marks and Marinette County), a 
sustainable ecosystem.203  In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court 
made this intergenerational limit explicit, stating that “[t]he 
legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its 
successors in respect to matters, the government of which, from the 
very nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances.”204  
Similarly, other courts have made this intergenerational aspect of 
the administration of public trust assets explicit.  Citing Edmund 
Burke, one New York court upheld government regulation of 
groundwater on the principle that the government was “merely 
discharging [its] obligation under the societal contract between 
‘[t]hose who are dead, those who are living and those who are yet 
to be born.’”205 
Conflicts between the interests of the current generation and 
those of future generations are well documented in trust law.  
 
202. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
203. Several commentators have likewise argued that ecosystem sustainability principles 
underpin (or ought to underpin) the public trust doctrine.  See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, 
Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine:  Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN 
ENVTL. L.J. 223, 228 (2006); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 18; Babcock, supra note 115, 
at 23; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust:  A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 612 (2004); Donna Christie, Marine Reserves, the 
Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 433 (2004); 
Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment 
for Present and Future Generations (Part 1):  Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 
ENVTL. L. 43 (2009). 
204. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1982); see also City of Alameda v. Superior 
Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the legislature cannot give 
away discretion so as to leave future legislature with no trust resources to work with). 
205. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. New York, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
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Trustees must routinely preserve trust assets for future beneficiaries 
even against the demands of current beneficiaries.206  The same 
concern for intergenerational equity underlies the moral and, to 
some extent, legal arguments for limiting GHG emissions.  Such 
limits would be construed as necessary to preserve a hospitable 
planet for future generations who will otherwise suffer the effects 
of excessive GHG generation without enjoying the economic 
benefits.207 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change explicitly relies 
on principles of intergenerational equity as the basis for actions 
limiting GHG emissions:  “[p]arties should protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”208  If, as appears to be the case, public trust principles 
encompass sustainability and intergenerational equity concerns, 
and if, as also appears likely, a government system of property 
rights in atmospheric resources implicates public trust concerns, 
how then should public trust analysis respond to a GHG cap-and-
trade system? 
C.  Application of the Public Trust Sustainability Principle on the 
Allocation of GHG Emissions Rights Through a Cap-and-Trade 
Scheme 
Government grants of tradable emissions rights in GHG 
pollutants invoke public trust concerns—such a system of tradable 
rights operates like property rights in the global atmosphere—but 
the public sale of “air” is specifically contemplated and rejected in 
the Justinian concept of public trust.  At the same time, however, 
 
206. See generally ARCHER ET AL., supra note 88, at 3, 38–39; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (2007) (describing duty to balance competing interests of current and 
future beneficiaries). 
207. See, e.g., James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (1996); Weiss, supra note 193, at 345.  Because future generations do not 
enjoy any representation in the current day legislature and political system, the interests of 
unrepresented future generations in preventing catastrophic climate change present a 
strong argument for judicial intervention in the political process under a “representation 
reinforcement” theory of judicial review.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980); Matthew Tuchband, The Systemic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade:  A 
Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2105–06 (1995). 
208. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), at art. 3. 
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the U.S. application of public trust doctrine generally does not 
preclude the sale of public trust assets to private interests.  Rather, 
as explained in Part II, such a sale is prohibited only when it 
deprives the public of an entire public trust resource or future 
decision makers of the same resources and choices enjoyed by the 
current decision makers.  Under this conception of the public trust 
doctrine, no system of allocations can be valid if the cap exceeds 
the requisite sustainable level of global emissions that avoids 
catastrophic climate change. 
1.  Public Trust Principles Do Not Preclude All Cap-and-Trade 
Schemes 
At the outset, it is clear that the public trust doctrine prevalent in 
the United States should not preclude all forms of cap-and-trade 
systems for GHG emissions.  While there remains a principled 
objection to granting private property rights to “air,”209 the 
Supreme Court and all of the States have long made clear that 
limited grants of public trust resources are permissible.  From cases 
such as Appleby and even Mono Lake, it is evident that while public 
trust principles may limit the scope of a state grant of public trust 
interests, it does not preclude such a grant altogether.  As the 
California Supreme Court put it, “[t]he state must have the power 
to grant non-vested usufructuary rights . . . .”210  The key to 
consistency of such a grant with the public trust is its 
sustainability—does the grant allocate such a large portion of the 
public trust resource to current interests that it deprives future 
generations of the equivalent environmental benefits enjoyed by 
the current generation? 
2.  Public Trust Principles and Over-allocations 
Under the sustainable usufruct view of the public trust, all cap-
and-trade proposals currently under consideration are 
unacceptable, since all contemplate phase-in periods during which 
 
209. I use “air” in quotes because an emissions trading system does not create specific 
property rights in air.  However, such a system would create undivided, tradable interests in 
the atmospheric commons that would certainly be considered a form of property.  See Carol 
M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 297 (1996) (analogizing tradable emissions rights to traditional 
property rights); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 64 (describing property rights in 
individual fishing quotas). 
210. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).  
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tradable emissions allocations would exceed the levels determined 
by global scientific consensus to be necessary.  The IPCC concluded 
that a fifty to eighty-five percent reduction is necessary by 2050,211 
and more recent reports suggest that even greater reductions will 
be required.  Under the first implementation period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2008–2012), emissions allocations were based on 
achieving only a five to eight percent reduction from 1990 levels.212  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, of which New York State is 
a part, contemplates a mere ten percent reduction from 1990 levels 
of GHG emissions by power utilities with 25 MW or greater 
generating capacities by 2019.213  The failed Lieberman-Warner 
climate bill would have had phased emissions reductions starting at 
four percent in 2012 and increasing to seventy-one percent in 
2050.214  The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
passed by the House of Representatives and awaiting action by the 
Senate, contemplates similar reductions of three percent below 
2005 levels by 2012 and twenty percent below 2005 levels by 2020.215 
Each of these cap-and-trade schemes contemplates decades of 
allocation of GHG emissions rights that are far in excess of the 
IPCC determined maximum sustainable emissions.  In essence, the 
sovereign “trustee” would invade the public trust “corpus” to make 
distributions in excess of the sustainable yield of the atmospheric 
“trust.”  By over-allocating these quantities of GHG emissions to the 
current generation of emitters—and by explicitly demanding that 
the 2050 generation vastly reduce GHG emissions and cope with 
the climate changes induced by the current generation’s 
emissions—deprives future legislatures of the choices enjoyed by 
the current legislature, just as surely as the grant of the entire 
Chicago waterfront to the railroad deprived future Illinois 
legislatures of the flexibility of making appropriate decisions about 
commerce and navigation to serve the public interest. 
As these excess allocations violate the legacy preservation 
 
211. See Barker et al., supra note 74, at 39. 
212. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 12, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1, art. 3, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
213. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, RGGI FACT SHEET, available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf. 
214. The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. § 
1201(d) (2008). 
215. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702 
(2009). 
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principle of the public trust doctrine, no scheme with such excess 
allocations should be valid.  As the responsibilities under the public 
trust doctrine are inherent in the nature of sovereignty, a court that 
reviews such congressional action should strike it down as beyond 
the powers of the national legislature, just as the courts struck 
down congressional attempts to draft state officials in enforcement 
of federal programs as beyond the inherent limits of sovereignty.216 
The fundamental problem with each of these schemes is that the 
current generation of sovereign actors would attempt to 
compromise the freedom of choice, actions, and atmospheric 
resources available to the next generation.  This problem cannot 
be solved even by an international agreement such as the Kyoto 
Protocol and its eventual successor agreement, as the fundamental 
value reflected by public trust is not a question of whether a 
sufficiently broad constituency of current actors accedes in the 
violative grant.  Rather, the problem is one of non-representation 
of future generations in the disposition of essential legacy 
resources.217  This defect cannot be solved even if every current 
sovereign nation on the planet agreed to the over-allocation. 
More problematic is the question of how the public trust 
doctrine’s sustainability principle should be applied to the 
domestic laws of a single nation, such as the United States, that is 
just one of many nations engaged in a pattern of GHG emissions 
that is collectively unsustainable.218  Public trust review of the 
domestic law of one nation then requires a determination of what 
level of emissions may be considered sustainable for an individual 
nation in the context of the possibly uncoordinated actions of 
other national actors.  Much has been written about just systems of 
international allocation of a sustainable GHG limit.219  Allocation 
 
216. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
217. See generally Mank, supra note 3; see also Weiss, supra note 193, at 345–51. 
218. See supra Part III.B. 
219. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits be 
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51 (2009); Albert Mumma & David Hodas, 
Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human Development, 20 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 619 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change:  Who Should 
Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 18–34 (2007) (discussing corrective and distributive 
justice theories); Lukas H. Meyer & Dominic Roser, Distributive Justice and Climate Change:  The 
Allocation of Emission Rights, 28 ANALYSE & KRITIK 223 (2006); Benito Muller, Varieties of 
Distributive Justice in Climate Change, 48 CLIMATIC CHANGE 273, 277 (2001); Eric Neumayer, In 
Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185, 187–
88 (2000); EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2006) 
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theories range from allocations based on per capita emissions,220 
and allocations based on existing aggregate emissions,221 to 
allocation systems incorporating compensatory over-allocations to 
adjust for the economic advantages developed nations enjoyed 
while using up the reserve GHG assimilative capacity of the global 
atmospheric system.222  Resolution of the question of what 
international allocation system is appropriate is well beyond the 
scope of this Article, and is not likely to be necessary to address the 
sustainability of any of the existing cap-and-trade proposals.  This is 
so because cap-and-trade proposals that defer any substantial 
reductions until the next generation fail the test of sustainability 
under even the most generous (from the U.S. perspective) system 
of allocations.  Even if the United States were assumed to continue 
a share of sustainable global GHG emissions based on its current 
 
(examining climate change through lens of distributive justice). 
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share of aggregate emissions, the sustainable levels of GHG 
emissions would be no more than twenty percent of 1990 U.S. 
emissions.223  Proposals that call for a cap in excess of this level 
represent an unsustainable rate of emissions for the United States 
taken individually.  An allocation scheme based on per-capita 
global allocation would require much greater reductions in U.S. 
emissions. 
Current cap-and-trade proposals thus fail the sustainability test 
and are inconsistent with the sovereign’s public trust 
responsibilities.  It may be objected that a limited system of cap-
and-trade is better than no system of regulation at all.  This is no 
answer to the principled application of public trust limits to a 
proposed system of allocated private ownership of the carbon 
carrying capacity of the global atmosphere.  Moreover, it is by no 
means self-evident that a system of over-allocation of resource 
exploitation rights is more resource protective than a system 
without limits.   
The experience with the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Act224 
provides a close analogy.  That act took a classic public trust 
resource (fisheries) that, like the atmosphere, was previously 
considered res communes (not susceptible of private ownership) and, 
like every cap-and-trade proposal on the table, sought to forestall 
the collapse of the resource by adoption of limits on the overall 
catch and then allocating these limits to fishermen.225  Also, like the 
cap-and-trade proposals under consideration, the Magnuson-
Stevens Fisheries Act allowed the calculation of the overall fish 
harvesting caps—the so-called “optimized yield”—to take into 
account social and economic factors instead of basing the cap 
 
223. An important issue that is beyond the scope of this Article is the relationship 
between any potential United States cap-and-trade program and global nature of air 
resources.  Rather, this Article focuses on a domestic cap-and-trade system under United 
States law.  Some interesting issues that are not addressed are whether Congress can meet its 
public trust obligations by enacting legislation that sets an appropriate cap for the United 
States’ share of global greenhouse gas emissions, whether domestic compliance with 
international agreements would be subject to public trust limitations, and who, if anyone, 
could potentially enforce those limits. 
224. Fishery, Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 
(1976). 
225. Id.  See generally Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to 
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1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 10, 53 (1998); Turnipseed et al., supra note 115, at 53–54; 
Kathryn J. Mengerink, Comment, The Pew Oceans Commission Report:  Navigating a Route to 
Sustainable Seas, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689, 708 (2004). 
  
334 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:2 
 
solely on the biological sustainability of the fishery.226  The resulting 
allocation of fish harvests by the so-called “fisheries management 
councils” was far in excess of the carrying capacity of the fishery.227  
The result has been the collapse of the Atlantic ground fisheries 
because fishing interests that benefited from maintaining current 
allocations had political control of the fisheries councils.228  GHG 
cap-and-trade schemes under consideration have every indication 
of following the Magnuson-Stevens’ Act’s failed approach, as the 
legislation under consideration contemplates initial caps that are 
based on easing the economic transition from the current fossil-
fuel based economy rather than any scientific measure of 
sustainability. 
Thus, under a public trust usufruct principle, a valid cap-and-
trade program must set the overall cap at a low enough level to 
support the global carrying capacity for GHGs. 
3.  Public Trust as an Interpretive Principle Precluding Vested 
Rights 
Even if public trust doctrine did not present a “hard,” 
enforceable prohibition against a cap-and-trade system with excess 
allocation of emissions rights, public trust principles may still 
present an interpretive principle that will limit the scope of the 
rights that private parties holding emissions rights may assert.  One 
of the principled objections to cap-and-trade programs is the 
possibility that such private “rights to pollute” might, like other 
forms of property, become vested over time so that government 
could no longer restrict emissions rights without paying 
compensation for taking the private property created by the 
allocation scheme.229  Some commentators have argued that 
 
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2006). 
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tradable emissions rights are “property” that may not be abrogated 
without compensation under the Takings Clause.230 
A system of allocated GHG emissions rights might create 
“property”-based claims for compensation in two ways.  First, an 
allocation scheme might create an expectation of continued 
allocations of emissions rights.  Second, and perhaps more 
problematic, cap-and-trade schemes that permit “banking”231 may 
create a property interest in the “banked” emissions credits, even if 
it later becomes apparent that the banked emissions rights will 
overwhelm measures necessary to avoid catastrophic global 
warming. 
Public trust doctrine provides an interpretive principle that 
should avoid claims of vested property rights subject to 
compensation.  Even if public trust principles are not an absolute 
limit on sovereign power to alienate trust resources, public trust 
cases have consistently required that legislative actions claimed to 
have alienated public trust assets to reflect an unambiguous intent.  
Thus, in one of the leading state public trust decisions, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that unique state 
parkland could not to be converted to uses inconsistent with the 
trust “without plain and explicit legislation.”232  Similarly, in Shively 
v. Bowlby, the United States Supreme Court applied public trust 
principles to limit the scope of riparian ownership rights granted 
by a pre-statehood congressional grant in Oregon territory, 
presuming that Congress would not act to deprive future states of 
public trust assets by granting sub-tidal lands to private owners. 
Similar application of public trust principles should preclude any 
claim that tradable emissions rights allocations, including “banked” 
emissions rights, create a form of property for which compensation 
would be required if future GHG allocation schemes require limits 
more stringent than those adopted by a particular cap-and-trade 
system. 
 
230. See supra note 229. 
231. Emissions “banking” allows holders of emissions rights to “bank” and reserve these 
emissions credits for use (or sale) in later years.  See generally Hahn & Lester, supra note 58, at 
129–30. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
A cap-and-trade system designed to limit or control global GHG 
implicates public trust principles, since such a system would create 
private rights in atmospheric resources that are contrary to the 
Justinian concept that the air is not subject to private ownership.  
While federal public trust doctrine has so far been applied only to 
navigable and tidal waters, it draws its roots from the Justinian 
concept of sovereignty, which supports the extension of the 
doctrine of non-traditional public trust assets to the atmospheric 
carrying capacity for GHGs.  A federal public trust doctrine would 
not preclude the establishment of a cap-and-trade program for 
GHGs.  There is a sustainability principle underlying public trust 
doctrine, however, that precludes any cap-and-trade system that 
allocates emissions rights in excess of those that can sustainably be 
absorbed by the climate system.  As all the cap-and-trade schemes 
so far implemented or considered include a phase-in period during 
which emissions rights exceed sustainable levels, all of these 
proposals violate public trust principles. 
